信息不对称下的供应链契约设计

Supply Chain Contract Designing under the Asymmetric Information

针对一个供应商与多个独立零售商组成的二级供应链,建立了零售商类型为其私人信息下的Stackelberg博弈模型。分析表明,文中提出的线性转移支付契约不仅可以激励零售商说出其真实类型,而且可以激励零售商积极进行业务流程重组、提高管理效率,增强供应链竞争力;但与信息对称情况下相比,供应商期望利润有所降低,且整个供应链存在效率损失。最后用实例验证了上述结论,并分析了零售商进行流程重组后的管理效率对供应链利润和效率的影响。

This paper establishes a Stackelberg model which consists of a supplier and some independent retailers with asymmetric information. The result shows that the linear transfer payment contract can not only expose retailers＇ types, hut also drive the retailers to positively carry on the flow reorganization to enhance the management efficiency and supply chain competitive ability. But comparing with full information, the supplier＇s expected profit will decrease, and the supply chain will lose some efficiency. Finally a numerical example is presented to confirm above conclusion, and to analyze the influence of the reorganized retailers＇ management efficiency on the supply chain profit and efficiency.