非对称信息下权力运行与监督制约中的“诺思悖论”

The "North’s Theory of Ganes" In the Authority Operating and Supervision Restricting under the Asymmetrical Information

权力主体拥有信息优势。权力主体之所以拥有信息优势,是因为他更接近信息源,同时由于人本性所具有权力倾向动机所产生的信息垄断。而监督制约是监督主体针对权力主体的权力运行所采取的约束手段,监督主体处于维护权力正确运行的被动而且明显的信息劣势地位,但也具有自己的相对独立性。在这种情况下,权力主体与监督主体之间存在严重的非对称信息问题。从这种非对称信息大格局下审视权力运行与监督制约,实际上可以把问题扩展为权力主体与监督主体所拥有的信息不对称状态下存在"诺思悖论"问题。然而,权力主体与监督主体非对称信息的体制性根源究竟何在?其相悖的社会动力机制又是怎样的?诸如此类的问题,都迫切需要作进一步的探讨。正是基于这样一种思考,本文拟在现有理论的基础上,尝试利用信息经济学的观点作为观察问题的新视角,予以对问题的剖析,并探求解决其困难的可能路径,这就是本文考察权力运行与监督制约问题的理论和方法。

The main body of authority occupies the dominant information.Because it approaches the information source more easily,and this is also decided by the human nature,which has the motivation of power inclination.Supervision restricting is a method ,which is used by the main body of supervision to restrain the power operating of the main body of authority.The main body of supervision lies in passive and obviously less important position in keeping the power operating on the right way.However,it has its own relative independence.In this case ,there is a serious asymmetrical information problem between the two bodies.Under the pattern of symmetrical information,we examine closely the authority operating and supervision restricting,and in fact,we may deeply understand it as a problem of ＂the same aim ,different opinions＂ on condition that the two bodies occupy different information. However,where is the problem of the system root？And what about the social power mechanism in contradiction to it？The problems like this should be urgently given further discussion.Based on this kind of consideration and the theory available at present, I want to analyze it and attempt to find the possible ways to deal with it by using the opinions from Information Economics as new perspective. This is the theory and way used in the paper to discuss the problem of authority operating and supervision restricting.