摘要
证券市场中各市场主体之间的合谋行为会产生虚假信息,扭曲市场价格,损害投资者利益和市场效率。研究市场中的合谋行为对建立完善的市场运作和管理机制具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。通过对市场交易过程和信息披露过程中合谋行为的分析,揭示市场机制设计中各可控外生性变量的调控方向和力度。研究表明,在存在监管合谋的情况下,处罚的效果是不确定的,而奖励机制可以有效的减少合谋的发生。
Conspiracy can be seen frequently on securities market and has great influence over the show of the market, so it is necessary to study the behavior of conspirators.In this paper, variables related to conspiracy during the processes of stock trading and information opening are analyzed to find out those exogenous variables by which conspirators select their strategy.Tile research purpose is to decide how much those exogenous controlled variables must be in a perfect market.Model analysis showed that effect of punish to conspiracy is contestable ,but encourage and reward to inspector is effective to avoid conspiracy on securities market.
出处
《价值工程》
2007年第9期153-156,共4页
Value Engineering
关键词
证券市场
信息披露
证券交易
合谋
监管
securities market
information announcing
stock exchange
conspiracy
inspection