用新规制俘获理论看社保案中的政府规制问题

Research on government regulation problems in Shanghai pension scandal

随着市场经济体制改革的深入,我国逐渐放开了公用事业领域的投资。近年来,民间资本进入公用事业领域的步伐逐渐加大。但在国家对公用事业投资放松管制的同时,也出现了不少亟待解决的问题。在上海社保案中牵涉到的张荣坤案,从一个侧面反映出公用事业引入民间投资出现的政府规制问题。施蒂格勒创立的规制俘获理论认为,规制机构会被规制行业所俘获,使其从中获利。用新规制经济学的规制俘获理论来分析社保案中的俘获问题,有利于改进和完善政府对公用事业民营化过程的规制。

With China＇s reform and opening to the outside world, it deepened the reform of market economy system and allowed the civil capital invest in public utilities. There are also some urgent problems needed to be resolved with the deregulation of the public utilities investment. The recent Shanghai pension scandal on issues in its capital injection into public utilities. Capture theory o developed by George Stigler, holds that a regulated industry can benefit from regulation by ＂cap f regulation, turing＂ the regulatory agency that has been involved. In this paper, the author tried to use the capture theory of regulation to analyse the problems of capture in the Shanghai pension scandal, so as to discuss the improvement of government regulation to the public utilities.