股权分置改革、机构投资者与投资者保护

The Reform of Non-tradable Shares,Institutional Investor and Investor's Protection

本文对我国股权分置改革过程中,机构投资者持股对中小投资者利益保护的影响进行了实证研究。为了客观衡量本次股改中流通股东所获得的对价补偿,本文设计了实际对价支付因子,结果发现,在已实施股改的公司中,实际对价支付因子平均仅为0.42,表明流通股东所获得的对价补偿并不高。在进一步的实证研究中,本文将机构投资者按照基金、券商和QFⅡ予以细分,发现三类机构投资者持股比例与流通股东的对价送达率、非流通股东的对价送出率以及实际对价支付因子均呈现显著负相关,从而验证了Pound(1988)提出的机构投资者和上市公司之间奉行的战略合作假说。上述结果表明,在股改过程中,机构投资者并没有实现对中小投资者利益的保护。

This paper empirically studies the relationship between institutional holding and investor protection during the non-tradable shares reform. In order to calculate the consideration compensation for the tradable share holders, the authors design the actual consideration payment factor and find the average rate is only 0. 42, that is to say the tradable share holders did not get high consideration payment. On the other hand, the authors divide the institutional investors into fund, securities and QFII groups. The results show the institutional holdings are significantly negative correlated with all the consideration ratios, which proves the strategy alignment hypothesis by Pound （ 1988 ）. The conclusion reflects the institutional investors cannot protect the interest of tradable share holders in the process of shareholding reform in China.