不同基金组织形式下管理人行为的博弈分析

The Choice of Managers Behavior in the Different Mutual Funds Forms on the Basis of Games Model Analysis

建立了基金管理人与投资者之间的不完全信息动态博弈模型,用以说明不同基金组织形式下基金管理人行为选择的差异。研究认为管理人的行为选择是其相机抉择的结果,开放式基金制度是否对管理人有更强约束力,取决于监督机制、声誉机制、管理人收入方案等因素。在模型分析的基础上,提出了减轻管理人机会主义行为的制度设计方案。

In this article, we establish a dynamic games model about managers and investors on the basis of imperfection information . we think that the restraints on the ＂moral hazards＂ behavior are in diversity in different mutual funds forms. The results are as follows： the choices of managers＇ behavior are the outcomes of watching for a choice. The open- end mutual funds have not always more constraints on the managers. Redemption mechanism in the open- end mutual funds strengthens the managers＇ opportunism behavior. Finally, we put forwards some advice about alleviating managers ＂moral hazards＂.