期刊文献+

经理人行为理论的争论与分歧 被引量:1

原文传递
导出
摘要 经理人的复杂行为是经济学与管理学长期争论的一个话题。代理理论与管家理论分别代表了这两大流派对经理人行为的不同理解。这两种理论对经理人行为预测的差别较大,而差别主要源于理论假设层面的不同。经济学与管理学假设前提的差异,引致了代理理论与管家理论对经理人行为的不同判断,而这两种推断不仅有实证层面的支持,也有理论运用层面的分歧。虽然代理理论与管家理论分别解释了不同领域的经理人行为,但都没有全面解释复杂的经理人行为。因此,在经理人行为的某些领域,代理理论与管家理论都有所局限,需要理论界的进一步推进。
作者 钟乃雄
出处 《经济学动态》 CSSCI 北大核心 2007年第11期92-96,共5页 Economic Perspectives
  • 相关文献

参考文献14

  • 1Amihud, Y. & B. Lev( 1981 ), "Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate mergers", Bell Journal of Economics, 12:605 - 617.
  • 2Argawal, A. & G. Mandelker ( 1987 ), "Managerial incentives and corporate investment and financing decision", Journal of Finance, 42-823 - 837.
  • 3Davis, J. H. , F. D. Schoorman & L. Donaldson(1997), "Toward a stewardship theory of management", Academy of Management Review, 22:20 - 47.
  • 4Donaldson, L. & J. H. Davis( 1991 ), “Stewardship theory or agency theory : CEO governance and shareholder returns”, Australian Journal of Management, 16:49 - 64.
  • 5Eisenhardt, K. (1989), “Agency theory: An assessment and review”, Academy of Management Review, 14:57 - 74.
  • 6Fox, M.A. & R. T. Hamilton(1994), “Ownership and diversification: Agency theory, or stewardship theory”, Journal of Management Studies, 31:69 - 81.
  • 7Jensen, M. & W. Meckling( 1976), "Theory. of the firm managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure", Journal of Financial Economics, 3:305 - 360.
  • 8Kosnik, R.G. (1987), "A study in board performance in corporate governance", Administrative Science Quarterly, 32:163 - 185.
  • 9Lane, P.J. , A. A. Cannella & M. H. Lubatkin( 1998 ), “Agency problems as antecedents to unrelated diversification: Amibud and Lev reconsidered”, Strategic Management Journal, 19:555 - 578.
  • 10Lane, P.J. , A. A. Cannella & M. H. Lubatkin (1999), “Ownership structure and corporate strategy: One question viewed from two different worlds”, Strategic Management Journal, 20 : 1077 - 1086.

同被引文献13

  • 1Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D. and L. Donaldson. Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management. Academy of Management Review, 22, pp.20-47, 1997.
  • 2Mizruchi, M. Who Controls Whom? An Examination of the Relation between Management and Boards of Directors in Large American Corporations. Academy of Management Review, 8, pp.426-435, 1983.
  • 3Fama, E., and M. Jensen. Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26, pp.301 -325, 1983.
  • 4Hambirck, D. Management Discretion: A Bridge between Polar View of Organization Outcomes. Research in Organizational Behaviour, 9, pp.369-406, 1994.
  • 5Child, J. Managerial and Organizational Factors Associated with Company Performance. Academy of Management Journal, 20, pp.42-56, 1974.
  • 6Wiersema, M., and K. Bantel. Top Management Team Demography and Corporate Strategic Change. Academy of Management Journal, 35, 91-121, 1992.
  • 7Stevens, J., Beyer, J., and H. Trice. Assessing Personal, Role, and Organizational Predictors of Management Commitment. Academy of Management Journal, 21, pp.380-396, 1978.
  • 8Daboub, A., Rasheed, A., Priem, R., and D. Gray. Top Management Team Characteristics and Corporate Illegal Activity. Academy of Management Journal, 20, pp.138 - 170, 1995.
  • 9Daily, C., and D. Dalton. Separate, But Not Independent: Board Leadership Structure in Large Corporations. Corporate Governance, 5, pp.126-136, 1997.
  • 10James, J. A Preliminary Study of the Size Determinant in Small Group Interaction. Ameffcan Sociological Review, 16, pp.474-477, 1951.

引证文献1

二级引证文献7

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部