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区域经济中地方政府行为的博弈分析——以京津冀地区为例 被引量:3

The Game Analyze on Local Government's Behavior in Area Economy——Taking the Jing-Jin-Ji area as An Example
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摘要 引入博弈论方法来研究京津冀三地的区域合作问题,把京津冀三方行政主体看作博弈的局中人,关注其中的"核心"问题——三方都能接受的利益分配方案、如何分配合作利益、如何建立有效的磋商机制以及协调机制的可行性与有效性。同时,提出应当在区域补偿、区域发展、产业布局三个方面寻求政策的改善。 In the research, the Gone Theory is taken in to research the area cooperation, suppose the three administration parts as the game's participators, focus on the core question: a scheme that can be accepted by all the three parts, how to distribute the benefit and setup a efficient negotiate mechanism. At the same time, put forward to ameliorate the police in three aspects: area redeem, devdopment and industry distribution.
作者 傅利平 姜聃
出处 《哈尔滨商业大学学报(社会科学版)》 2007年第6期26-29,共4页 Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Social Science Edition
关键词 区域经济 地方政府 博弈理论 京津冀地区 regional economy local government game theory Jing- Jin- Ji area
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