股权集中型企业所得税逃税研究

Income Tax Evasion in Concentrated Ownership Regimes Enterprise

股权集中型企业的经营管理,很大程度在其大股东的控制之下,公司的逃税决策由大股东做出。一方面,控股股东可以利用其对公司经营的监督行为,向小股东收取一定的租金,并利用其控制权作出是否要进行逃税的决策;另一方面,在操纵公司进行逃税时,控股股东也可以利用信息不对称,进一步侵占原本属于小股东的逃税收益,这些都将影响控股股东的逃税决策。该文将建立股权集中型企业的所得税逃税模型,并对大股东利益侵占行为对逃税决策的影响进行分析。

The management and the operation of the concentrated ownership regimes enterprise were mainly controlled by the major shareholders. They controlled the company in a certain extent and the tax evasion. These shareholders could take a certain rent from minority shareholders while they monitored the managers and explored the tax evasion decision of control. On the other hand operating shareholders could also extract private benefits from minority shareholders in tax evasions. These fac- tors could affect the decisions of shareholders. Some models for income tax evasion of concentrated ownership regimes in this paper were constructed and the influence of extracts of controlling shareholders on the corporate tax evasion decisions was analyzed.