“二元民主”权力架构下的美国府会战争权

The American Congressional and Presidential War Power under the "Bipolar Diplomacy" Structure of Foreign Affairs

在美国分权制衡的政治体制下,国会与总统分享外交决策权力,并形成了独特的"二元民主"外交权力架构,本文分析了这一二元性权力架构得以形成的原因,并以府会在二战后围绕战争权力的争夺和交锋为重点,探讨了国会作为该契构下相对独立的一极,其战争权力的起伏消长及其对美国相关政策制定和实施所具有的影响。

Under the check and balance political system of the United States, the foreign-policy-making power is shared by Congress and the president, which results in the unique ＂bipolar diplomacy＂ power structure in the field of foreign affairs. This paper first tends to explain the reasons for such a bipolar structure, and then with the analysis of the struggle and conflicts about war power between these two branches after the Second World War, it reviews the power shift of Congress as a relatively independent institution and its influence upon the foreign policy of the states.