身体的认识论地位——论波兰尼默会认识论的身体性维度

The Epistemological Status of Body: On the Embodiment Dimension of Polanyi' s Theory of Tacit Knowing

在身体性这个维度上,波兰尼的默会认识论和梅洛-庞蒂的知觉现象学之间存在着某种思想的会聚。从知觉的身体性出发,通过对"身体在宇宙中的特殊地位"、关于身体的辅助意识的核心地位、"通过寓居而认识"等思想的阐发,默会认识论深刻地揭示了人类知识的身体根源。在关于他人之心的知识和身心关系问题上,波兰尼在强调心灵的身体性的同时,对心灵与其外在表现、心灵与身体作了区分,得出了心灵是其外在表现的意义,心灵是身体的意义的结论。

On the theme of embodiment Michael Polanyi＇s theory of tacit knowing and Merleau-Ponty＇s phenomenology of perception converge. Taking the embodiment of perception as a point of departure, Polanyi, by clarifying ＂the unique status of our body in the universe,＂ the centrality of the subsidiary awareness of body, and the thesis of ＂knowing by indwelling,＂ elaborates the bodily root of human knowledge. On the problem of knowledge of other minds and the mind-body problem, Polanyi, underscoring the embodiment of mind, nevertheless sees the difference between the mind and its external workings, and the difference between mind and body, and argues that the mind is the meaning of its external workings, and that the mind is the meaning of the body. In this connection, Marjorie Grene＇ s critique of Polanyi on the mind-body problem is off the mark.