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信誉资本与会计诚信契约的自动履行 被引量:3

The Reputation Capital and Self-enforcing of Accounting Integrity Contract
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摘要 由于受到“成本——效益”因素的制约,会计诚信契约的强制履行不可避免存在履约盲区,信誉机制在会计诚信契约的自动履行中的作用不可或缺。信誉机制对会计诚信契约自动履约范围大小由会计规则执行者的私人履约资本决定,因此,建立一个有利于私人履约资本生成和积累的社会制度环境是提高会计诚信水平的重要途径。 With the "cost-benefit" restriction, the compulsive enforcement of accounting integrity contract has inevitable blind spots, and the reputation mechanism is indispensable for self-enforcing of accounting integrity contract. The self-enforcing scope of reputation mechanism is restrained by the private enforcement capital of accounting regular performers. Therefore, it is important to establish a social system environment for producing and accumulating private enforcing capital in order to enhance accounting integrity.
作者 刘建秋 段琳
出处 《财经论丛》 CSSCI 北大核心 2007年第3期65-70,共6页 Collected Essays on Finance and Economics
基金 教育部全国教育科学"十五"规划重点课题(DEB03027) 湖南省社科基金资助项目(06ZC105) 湖南省教育厅科学研究项目
关键词 会计诚信契约 信誉资本 履约范围 自动履行 accounting integrity contract reputation capital enforcement scope self-enforcing
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参考文献9

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二级参考文献25

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