摘要
在官员选拔制下,中国的横向政府竞争体现出典型"囚徒困境"的特征,其表现就在于严重的地方保护主义和重复建设问题。如果中央政府能够充分发挥地方政府横向竞争的"调控者"作用,中国的横向政府竞争将能达致一个较优的结果。
Under the official selection and promotion system, the interjurisdictional competition in China is a kind of Prisoner＇s Dilemma game, whose results are the serious local protectionism and repeated construction around the whole country. If the central government can play the role of monitor in the interjurisdictional competition, a better competition result could be reached in the interjurisdictional competition in China.
出处
《中国社会科学院研究生院学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第6期5-11,共7页
Journal of Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
关键词
横向政府竞争
地方保护主义
重复建设
interjurisdictional competition in China
local protectionism
repeated construction
