论审计反腐功能的理论分析及其制度创新

A Theoretical Analysis of the Anti-corruption Auditing and its Institutional Innovation

近来,公众对审计在反腐倡廉中的作用由"审计风暴"初期的充满期望和快慰到近期的令人失望和无奈,从而引发了对审计反腐作用的重新思考。本文首先从理论上进行分析论证,一方面腐败的产生是缘于人的欲望的无限;另一方面,是权力的缺乏制度约束,或对权力的约束不力;而审计在实现权力制衡的监督体系中,是不可或缺的重要组成部分。由于腐败的种类繁多,发生的领域各异,有的会在被审单位的会计资料及其他经济资料中留下蛛丝马迹,能被审计所发现;有的则可能与被审单位的经济活动没有直接关系,不能被审计所发现,因此,审计反腐败有效,但也有限。为了增强审计的反腐功能,笔者提出应从两方面改革创新审计制度,一是改革现行审计制度,突出审计反腐功能的审计目标、审计报告和审计问责等制度创新;二是建立领导干部廉洁自律报告审计制度,发挥审计在反腐防腐中的积极作用。

The public response to the auditing storm has turned from the initial euphoria to the recent disappointment, thus rekindling the reflection on the role of auditing in combating corruption. The paper begins with a theoretical examination, and traces t the cause of corruption to the insatiable human desire on the one hand and the unchecked power of officials on the other. Auditing plays an important role herein. Some corruption cases can be detected via auditing while others may evade detection. So the effectiveness of auditing is limited. To solve the problem, two approaches are proposed in the paper： to reform the current auditing system and prioritize the function of combating corruption： through institutional innovation： to institutionalize the accountability practice.