公用事业行业的价格管制缺陷及其治理途径——基于南京市公交行业涨价的案例研究

The Price Controlling Defect of Public Utility and Its Solutions——A Case Study Based on a Price Increasing Event in Common Communication Industry in Nanjing

研究了公用事业行业价格持续上涨背后的价格管制缺陷及其治理途径。以南京市公交行业的涨价事件为案例,研究表明:在现行价格管制下,公用事业行业涨价的深层次原因并不是企业的亏损问题,而是公用事业行业作为一个利益整体与政府、社会公众等利益集团博弈的结果;在公用产品市场处于寡头垄断的状况下,企业间合谋是价格上涨的主要原因,而企业合谋的成因在于对公用产品的无限期经营和对亏损的直接补贴这两方面的制度缺陷;有效的治理途径是建立规范的特许权经营制度和改变现有的亏损补贴政策。

This paper has studied the price controlling defect of public utility under the background ot price increasing and its solutions. Taking the price increasing event in public transportation industry in Nanjing as a case, it is revealed that the inner reason of public industry price increasing is not because enterprises loss but the outcome of a game with other interest groups, such as government and the public. The conspiracy among enterprises is the main reason of price increasing when public product market is oligopoly. The reasons of conspire are the unlimited operating of public goods and the mechanism defect of government compensation. The effective solutions are to establish normal concession management right system and to change existing loss compensation policy.