地方政府对国外直接投资税率竞争的博弈分析

本文采用伯川德价格竞争模型研究两个地方政府如何制定税率来竞争一个外商投资项目。分析了企业在不同地区投资的价值由公有信息和私有信息组成时,投资环境的异同对于均衡税率的影响。若投资环境同质,两地方政府税率竞争均衡时税率为零;若投资环境对企业有差异,均衡税率大于零。两种情况下的均衡税率都低于社会福利最大化时的税率水平。

Using Hertrand Model this, article studies how local government attract FDI by tax ralc competitioin and the effect on equilibrium tax ratc when the value of investment have botd public and private information, when the Iwo dislricts are identical, the cquilibium tax rate are zero; While the investment environments arc differebt, the cquilibrium lax rate is positive. However, the contpelitive tax rates are lower lhan the ＂best＂ tax rate in both cases.