公司监督与现金股利代理理论实证研究

Empirical Research on Corporate Monitors and Agency Theory of Cash Dividends

用第一大股东持股比例、外部大股东持股比例和董事会中独立董事比例作为公司监督效果的代理变量,本文提供了一个现金股利能够减小代理成本的新证据。在控制了股利变动率、未预期净资产收益率、公司财务杠杆、公司规模以及经营业绩等因数的影响后,本文发现,市场对增加现金股利公告的反应与第一大股东持股比例正相关,与公司监督质量负相关。本文的结果暗示,在公司监督无效时,分派现金股利是一个降低代理成本的必要替代选择。

Using the percentage of shares held by the largest stockholder, the percentage of shares held by outside stock-holders and the proportion of outside directors in Board of Directors as agency variables for the effect of corporate monitors, this paper reports a new evidence on the hypothesis that dividends reduce agency costs. After the multivariate controls over the influences of factors including the change rate in dividend yield, unexpected ROE, leverage of corporate finance, firm size and operat-ing performance, this paper finds that the market reaction to the event of dividend increase announcment is positive related to the percentage of shares held by the largest stockholder, and negative related to the effect of corporate monitors. The conclusion of this paper implicates that cash dividend distribution can be a necessary alternative to substitute for ineffective corporate monitors in the interest of mitigating agency costs.