论物权的道义论基础

On Deontological Basis of Real Right

在建构一种物权的道义论意图下,本文首先论证,康德定言命令前两种表述在逻辑上的非等价性为物权道义论预留了可能的空间;然后从第一表述的可普遍化原则出发,推出物权道义论的内部规则:1)除非我也愿意别人对某物的占有,我不应占有该物;2)除非我也愿意别人以同样的方式对待某物,我不应该如此手段化或使役该物;最后,从意志自由的条件("不知"和"不欲")出发,导出物权道义论的外部规则,即万物具有平等的道德地位。

The nonidentity spares a possible space for a deontology of the real right between the first and the second forms of Kant＇ s categorical imperative. From the first form, we can deduce the internal rules of the real right： 1 ） I shouldn＇ t take some thing unless I will that the others take it as I do ; 2） I shouldn＇ t use some thing unless I will that the others treat it as I do. From the conditions, ignorance and omission, of free will, we can deduce the external rule of the real right, which all things have the equal moral status.