软预算约束、银行危机与金融监管

Soft Budget Constraints,Banking Crises and Financial Regulation

本文利用不完全信息动态博弈模型,探讨了金融危机、监管者的软预算约束与银行道德风险之间的关系。研究发现:金融危机愈高,监管者的软预算约束愈大,因此,消除软预算约束是降低金融危机最重要的监管措施;建设性模糊策略能够有效消除金融机构对软预算约束的预期心理;随着银行的道德风险上升,金融危机也会升高。

Using a dynamic game model of incomplete information, this paper discusses the relations among financial crisis, regulator＇s soft budget constraints and banker＇s moral hazard. We find that： the more severe the financial crises will be, the greater soft budget constrained to regulators, so the mitigating soft budget constraints is the most important regulatory policies of reducing financial crises; a random creative ambiguity for regulators to offer bailout or rescue plans may mitigate the expectation of soft budget constraints for financial institutions; with the banker＇s moral hazard increasing, the financial crises severing too.