战略性贸易产业R&D补贴的实施策略研究——事前补贴与事后补贴之比较

A Study on the Implementing Strategy of R&D Subsidy in Strategic Trade Industries——A Comparison between Beforehand Subsidy and Afterward Subsidy

我国在世贸组织规制下对战略性贸易产业实施保护面临选用什么样的政策保护工具及如何实施的问题?R&D补贴因其具有非专项性和非贸易扭曲性而成为符合世贸组织规制的贸易保护工具。本文利用博弈模型和数据模拟法对R&D补贴的两种实施策略进行了比较,发现事后R&D补贴策略能够产生更大的福利效果,更加有利于节约资源和避免寻租,是优于事前R&D补贴的实施策略,具有更强的现实可行性,值得我国政府采纳。

Under the regulation of WTO, China is facing with two major questions in how to implement protection on strategic trade industries. One is what kind of protection tool should be choosen？ The other is how to implement protection policy？ Because of its non-specific and non-distoned characters, R＆D subsidy has become a trade protection tool, which matches the rules of WTO very well. There are two types of strategies to implement the R＆D subsidy： beforehand subsidy and afterward subsidy. Different strategies have different political effects. This paper makes a comparison between these two strategies through game model and data simulation method. A key result is that afterward R＆D subsidy will increase the welfare more by saving resources and avoid rent-seeking more effectively, hence it is a better way for carring out R＆D subsidy. As it possesses stronger practical feasibility, adopting it is more advisable to Chinese Government.