摘要
本文利用整体博弈方法分析市场经济的信任基础。在普特南(2001)基础上,从水平型和垂直型社会资本的不同结构讨论了这些结构对社会资本水平的影响。对于水平型社会资本结构,当存在足够多的独立社会中间组织时,社会资本唯一均衡是高水平均衡;而对于垂直型社会资本,在市场交易仲裁者存在信息操纵情况下,社会资本水平可能出现多重均衡,但均衡的稳定性不同。
Based on the Putnam＇s work on social captial, we analyse the horizontal and vertical structure of th social capital how to influence the market＇s trust level, by using the global game method. The horizontal can induce the only high-level trust equilibrium. While in the vertical, when considering the market arbitrator can manipulate the public information, there are multiple eqilibriums in the trust level, and which stability is different in these equilibriums.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第11期104-111,共8页
Economic Research Journal
