不对称信息下的地方干预与超限额采伐

Local Government Intervene and Over-quota Harvesting Under Information Asymmetry

建立了双任务委托——代理理论模型,证明了地方政府基于财政动机而进行的干预可能是助长林业企业超限额采伐的制度原因。通过对国有林业企业行为与地方财政行为关系的分析,提出改善林区地方财政状况,为地方财政消肿的政策建议,以期天然林保护工程取得较好的效率。

This paper set a dual-task principal-agent model and identified that intervening from local government based on fiscal mode should be the institutional reason for over-quota harvesting by state-owned forest farms.Through analysis of relation between state-owned forest farms behavior and local government fiscal behavior,this paper proposed that local fiscal condition in nature forestry zone should be reformed to decrease the public output in the hope that the project of natural forestry protection should get better performances.