摘要
在委托代理模型的基本框架下,引入概率约束条件代替参与约束,分析研究了模型中的激励机制问题。结果表明,要想提高农民工(代理人)的收入水平,必须提高农民工(代理人)外部选择权即保留收入。
According to principal-agent model,incentive problem is studied by introducing probability restriction instead of individual rationality.The result shows that it is necessary to improve external selecting right of migrant workers（agents）,namely base income of migrant workers,in order to improve income of migrant workers（agents）.
出处
《安徽农业科学》
CAS
北大核心
2007年第33期10910-10911,10914,共3页
Journal of Anhui Agricultural Sciences
关键词
委托代理
概率约束
外部选择权
博弈
Principal-agent
Probability restriction
External selecting right
Game
