隧道行为与盈余管理——基于我国家族上市公司的实证研究

Tunneling and Earnings Management:Empirical Study on Family-controlled Listed Firms in China

本文利用"隧道行为"理论解释我国家族上市公司的盈余管理活动。通过对2002-2004年间我国家族上市公司样本的实证检验,结果发现,控制性家族控制权偏离现金流量权的程度越大,公司盈余管理幅度越高。这说明控制性家族有动机操纵盈余以隐藏其掏空公司资源的"隧道行为",从而补充了现有对公司盈余管理动机的研究。

Based on ＂tunneling＂ theory, this paper tries to explain earnings management of family-controlled listed firms. Using the data of family-controlled listed firms from 2002 to 2004 in China, evidences are showed that controlling families have strong incentive to manage earnings to conceal their ＂tunneling＂ for expropriating firm＇s resources and that the extent of earnings management is positive with the wedge between their control rights and cash flow rights. Therefore, this study complements the prior researches about the incentives of earnings management.