摘要
本文的切入点是影响山西省农民负担决定的因素,分析的重点是既有文献中暗含的"高级别地方政府无关假定"。以城市为分析单位,使用计量经济学中面板数据的分析方法,本文的研究结果证实了已有的两种主要理论观点(非农收入理论与财政支出理论)的稳健性;这就意味着"高级别地方政府无关假定"是与事实不符的假定,这样的假定会局限人们对农民负担问题的深入理解。同时,这样的发现还意味着在农民负担决定问题上,各级地方政府的行为存在着某种事实上的一致性,从而为分析财政分权体制下政府竞争或串谋存在的范围提供了一个重要的案例。
The research question in this article is what the determinants of farmers' burden are. The author wanted to verify the assumption that "higher local governments have no relevance with the determining of farmers' burden". Using city as unit of analysis and panel data model, the author found that loth of the existed two theory could perfectly answer the question. The theory is about fiscal and other income from nonagricultural sector and fiscal expenditures. Thus, the result means that local governments behave consistently when it comes to the issues of farmers' burden, that is, behavior consistency from local governments exist implicitly. This implies competition among local governmen is conditional on many other factors, so this article also shows a case that may give reference to deep analysis on governments' competition or collusion.
出处
《南方经济》
北大核心
2007年第11期63-71,共9页
South China Journal of Economics
关键词
农民负担
地方政府
行为一致性
Farmers' Burden
Local Governments
Behavior Consistency