完善我国商业银行“反洗钱”的激励机制

Improve the Incentive Mechanism of China Commercial Bank against Money Laundering

运用博弈论对洗钱者、商业银行、监管者在洗钱与反洗钱中的策略与行动选择进行分析。通过分析发现,造成反洗钱低效的原因主要是银行业缺乏有效的激励机制,导致洗钱者的成本低而收益高,而反洗钱的收益低却成本高。因此,应增加洗钱者的洗钱成本,加大对洗钱者与违规银行的惩罚力度,对反洗钱积极合作的商业银行给予激励。

Using the game theory, the author analyses the strategy and action choice among money launders, commercial banks and regulatory authority, then points out the reasons for the low efficiency in anti-money laundering. It can be thought that the banking sector lacks of the efficient incentive mechanism. As a result, money launders can obtain high profits at the expense of low cost while anti-money launders only obtain low profits at the expense of high cost. So the money launders should be punished severely at the expense of high laundering cost, At the same time, the regulatory authority should improve the incentive system towards these commercial banks in active cooperation with anti-money laundering.