彩票发行中委托代理的博弈分析及制度选择——以即开型彩票为例

The Analysis of Principal-agency and Institutional Choice in Lottery Issuance from the Perspective of Game Theory——Take Spot Lottery as An Example

我国即开型彩票发行中普遍存在着由承销商进行市场销售的委托—代理关系,受信息不对称影响,彩票发行机构与承销商之间便产生了委托—代理的道德风险。本文分别建立了委托—代理关系中政府与承销商间一次博弈模型和重复博弈模型,分析政府与承销商间相互依存行为的影响要素及作用机制,为我国彩票发行中承销制度改革提供建议。

In our country principal - agent relationship exists commonly in spot lottery which is issued by consignees. Influenced by information asymmetry, there turns out the moral hazard between lottery ＇issuance agency and consignees. The article construct both single game model and repeated game model between the government and consignees in the principal - agent relationship and educed the factors and mechanism that affect the dependent behavior between government and consignees. Based on that, the article brings out suggestions for the reform of consigning institution in lottery issuance in our country.