摘要
本文选取2003～2005年披露最终控制人的上市公司面板数据,研究不同股权性质的上市公司总经理更换当年的投资决策。研究结果显示,国有控股上市公司总经理更换当年没有明显的寻租行为,民营控股上市公司总经理更换当年存在明显的寻租行为。但是,无论是国有还是民营控股上市公司,公司治理都不能有效地抑制总经理离任前的寻租行为。
Through 2003-2005 panel data of Chinese listed company with ultimate ownership exposed, this paper make an empirical study on the investment decision-making in the year of CEO turnover, to investigate whether departing CEO in different shareholding-structure company have the same rent-seeking motivation. We also construct board of directors and board of supervisors index, to investigate if corporate governance do mitigate the rent-seeking behavior. We found that, compared with CEO in state controlled company, CEO in non-state controlled company is opportunistically maximizing his benefit surrounding departure. However, there is no evidence show that corporate governance could mitigate such opportunistically behavior.
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第23期77-81,共5页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
关键词
总经理更换
公司治理
寻租
CEO turnover
corporate governance
rent seeking
