投资者恶性增资行为的控制机制探讨——基于原生性认知和负反馈信息明确化的考察

A Probe into the Mechanism for Controlling the Vicious Behavior of Investors' Increasing Funds

本文探讨了在资本预算项目决策中,投资者恶性增资行为的控制机制。文中首先提出了同时使用相对降低投资者的原生性认知和使负反馈信息明确化两种途径,可有效地抑制投资者的恶性增资行为。采用综合设定项目最低报酬率方式可同时达到这一目的。其次,本文运用模拟实验法对该观点进行了验证。验证结果表明:综合设定项目最低报酬率的方式既能有效地抑制恶性增资行为,又可以使设定的最低报酬率与公司期望的最低报酬率无显著差异。

This paper explores the mechanism for controlling investors＇behavior of increasing capital viciously in the decision -making of capital budget projects. First of all this paper proposes that taking simuhaneously the two measures of decreasing relatively the original cognition of investors and clarifying negative feedback information can restrain effectively investors＇behavior of increasing capital viciously. Taking the means of lowest return rate for comprehensively predetermined projects can achieve this purpose at the same time. Then using simulating experimentation this paper tests the point of view. The result shows that the method of lowest return rate for comprehen- sively predetermined projects can both restrain investors＇behavior of increasing funds viciously and make the predetermined lowest return rate close to the lowest return rate expected by companies.