论反倾销保护对企业R&D投入的影响

On the Effect of Antidumping Protection on the R&D Investment of Enterprises

现阶段借助反倾销等手段进行贸易保护在世界范围内比比皆是。但贸易保护措施也会产生一定的成本,对于反倾销的实施成本研究也成为了当下的热点,众多国家在反倾销条例中规定了公共利益条款就是为了减小反倾销实施成本。笔者以相互倾销模型为基础,运用博弈论分析自由贸易、单方反倾销、双方反倾销和合作创新博弈对企业R&D存在溢出效应情况下的影响,并对四种情况下企业的价格、产出和R&D均衡解进行比较,剖析了实施反倾销的理论依据。

Presently resorting to antidumping for trade protection is very prevalent throughout the world. However trade protection measures have their cost and the research of the cost of antidumping has become a hot issue and a lot of countries stipulates the public interest clause in the law of antidumping just to diminish the cost of antidumping implement. The article, based on the model of reciprocal dumping, uses game theory to analyse the influence of free trade, unilateral antidumping protection, bilateral antidumping protection and cooperative innovation game on the spillover effect of enterprises, then compares the corporate solution of price, output and R＆D equilibrium in those four situations, and finally analyses the theoretical basis of antidumping practice.