基于不完全信息博弈理论的地方煤矿安全监管的博弈分析

Game Analysis of Safety Supervision in Local Coal Mine Based on the Game Theory of Incomplete Information

运用不完全信息重复博弈的基本理论和分析方法,建立了地方政府与煤矿企业的多阶段动态博弈模型。不完全信息的引入改变了完全信息博弈中地方政府会随着从煤矿生产中获益越大对其提供的庇护程度越大,而企业必然选择干扰的结论。一旦地方政府的这种合作行为出现,国家在安全监察方面的成本和难度将会大大减低。

The dynamic multistage game model of local governments and coal enterprises is established using the basic theory and analysis methods of the repetition game of incomplete information. The introduction of incomplete information has changed the result that the enterprises must use the interferenfial strategy resulting from the more benefits the govemment gets from the production of coal mine, the more proteetion the government gives in complete information game. Once this kind of cooperation behavior of local government appears, the cost and the difficulty of safety supervision of our country will decrease.