基于定价权的目标企业博弈定价策略

Game pricing tactics of target firm based on pricing right

正确的定价策略是取得并购成功的关键.运用博弈理论研究非对称信息条件下并购双方的谈判思路及定价策略,就定价权属于目标企业及并购企业2种情况,分别推导出贝叶斯纳什均衡下的最优判断和策略组合;在此基础上,分析了定价权对并购双方收益的影响.研究发现,并不是定价权掌握在哪一方的手中,该方就将获得更好的收益,收益的情况还要受并购双方资源潜在的协同效应大小、谈判折算系数等因素影响,定价权的转移将直接影响并购双方的收益.

Whether a merger and acquisition is successful or not depends on the negotiators pricing strategies. In this paper we employ game theory to study the negotiation ideas of both sides and pricing tactics under asymmetric information conditions. An optimal combination of judgment and tactics is proposed based on Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in the case that the pricing rights, or authority to set the price, are in different negotiators hands. On the basis of the above, the effects of pricing rights on the incomes of both sides of a merger and acquisition were studied. The study found that it isn＇t the one who has pricing rights who automatically gets better income= other factors affect the profit of a merger and acquisition, such as synergistic effects between the acquiring firm and the target firm and the negotiation convertible coeffi- cient. Moreover, the transfer of pricing rights directly affects the incomes of both sides.