摘要
正确的定价策略是取得并购成功的关键.运用博弈理论研究非对称信息条件下并购双方的谈判思路及定价策略,就定价权属于目标企业及并购企业2种情况,分别推导出贝叶斯纳什均衡下的最优判断和策略组合;在此基础上,分析了定价权对并购双方收益的影响.研究发现,并不是定价权掌握在哪一方的手中,该方就将获得更好的收益,收益的情况还要受并购双方资源潜在的协同效应大小、谈判折算系数等因素影响,定价权的转移将直接影响并购双方的收益.
Whether a merger and acquisition is successful or not depends on the negotiators pricing strategies. In this paper we employ game theory to study the negotiation ideas of both sides and pricing tactics under asymmetric information conditions. An optimal combination of judgment and tactics is proposed based on Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in the case that the pricing rights, or authority to set the price, are in different negotiators hands. On the basis of the above, the effects of pricing rights on the incomes of both sides of a merger and acquisition were studied. The study found that it isn't the one who has pricing rights who automatically gets better income= other factors affect the profit of a merger and acquisition, such as synergistic effects between the acquiring firm and the target firm and the negotiation convertible coeffi- cient. Moreover, the transfer of pricing rights directly affects the incomes of both sides.
出处
《哈尔滨工程大学学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2007年第11期1282-1286,共5页
Journal of Harbin Engineering University
基金
黑龙江省社会科学基金资助项目(06D031)
关键词
企业并购
目标企业
定价权
博弈理论
enterprise's merger and acquisition
target firm
pricing right
game theory