地方政府耕地保护激励机制研究——基于团队理论的分析框架

A Research into Local Government's Stimulation Mechanism of Cultivated Land Protection——An Analytic Framework Based on Team Theory

基于"团队理论"的模型,分析了在"满足预算平衡"或是"打破预算平衡"两种情况下,在耕地保护行动中地方政府的"偷懒"或"搭便车"问题的原因。接着引入一个"索取剩余的委托人——中央政府,"从而解决这个问题,实现团队预期目标。结论表明:应建立绩效评估与财政转移支付制度,合理确定各地方政府的耕地保有量,降低管理成本,提高管理效率,强化土地执法,树立中央权威。

Based on the model of team theory, this paper analyzes the reasons of local government shirking and ＂hitchhiking＂ in the process of protecting cultivated land under the condition of meeting the budget balance or breaking the budget balance, and then introduces the central government as ＂a surplus claimant＂to solve the problem and reach the goal of the team ,with the result that it is significant to build a system of performance appraisal and fiscal transfer payment institution, determine a rational tenure amount of cultivated land of local governments, reduce the cost of management, improve the efficiency of management, intensify the execution of land-law and build the authority of the central government.