我国矿产资源有偿使用制度演化的博弈分析

A Study of Game of Paid Use System Evolution of China's Mineral Resources

通过运用博弈论的思想与方法,分析我国矿产资源有偿使用制度的演化。现存矿产资源税费制度是有偿使用制度演化的基础,构成参与主体利益博弈的基本规则,决定了制度的演化方向和演变结果,因而制度是博弈的基础,也是利益博弈的结果。短期来看,有偿使用制度的演化将是资源税和补偿费各自在局部范围内进行调整,不会向统一或合并方向发展;长期来讲,有偿使用制度的演化必将涉及矿产资源财产制度的修改与完善,建立与市场经济相适应和与国际惯例相符合的财权制度,但这种制度如何建立还有待进一步进行综合研究。

Applying the idea and method of game, this paper analyzes the evolution of paid use system of China＇s mineral resources, pointing out that China＇s mineral resource tax-fee system is the basis of paid use system. Through analyzing the evolutionary game in the system reform of China＇ s mineral resources, the paper argues that the system could be changed actually in a short term, but it would be adjusted to adapt to the market system in a long term.