晋升激励、宏观调控与经济周期：一个政治经济学框架

Promotion Based Incentives,Macroeconomic Control and Business Cycles:a Framework of Political Economics

本文在一个以控制权收益为基础的晋升激励框架下,考察中国经济周期的形成。本文研究发现,由于政府保持着经济的控制权,政府组织中晋升激励体制的周期性和中央政府的宏观调控共同构成了中国经济周期性波动的主要成因,中国的经济周期本质上是"晋升体制周期"和"宏观调控"结合的产物,这推翻了学界"宏观调控是经济周期的应对手段"的一贯认识。在此基础上,本文构建了一个理论模型用以刻画这一逻辑。进一步的经验实证支持了上述逻辑。本文的政策含义是,转变经济增长方式和进一步的产权改革以适度放松政府对经济的控制将有利于经济的良性发展。

This paper investigates the china＇s business cycles under a framework of promotion based incentives which based on the benefits of political control rights. We found that the most important reason of china＇s business cycles is that the government contains the control rights of economy and the incentive mechanism in the government is promotion based incentives. The business cycles in china and the cyclical incentive mechanism in government always go hand in hand. Then we set up a model of political business cycle theory to describe our logic and the historical data give a firm evidence of it. The policy suggestion of this paper is that further reform in the property rights will be better for the economic development.