交易费用不对称与企业产权制度选择——对轮船招商局“官督商办”体制的一种解释

Disproportionate Transactional Costs Versus Choice of Enterprise Property Right Systems

当保护产权和市民权利的法律制度不完善，官员的权力难以按法律程序有效制约时，界定和实施产权的交易费用在官员和市民之间就会出现不对称分布。在交易费用不对称条件下，投资者与官员可能会达成某种程度的合作：投资者提供资本，官员承担保护企业产权的责任，形成为依附型产权，剩余收益权在投资者与官员之间进行分配。轮船招商局“官督商办”体制形成的原因，并非仅出于清政府和洋务派官僚单方面的意愿。

When there is not an perfect legal system which can protect property right and common peoples right and restrain effectively the power of government officials, transactional costs on the establishment and implementation of property right tend to bring about a disproportionate distribution between officials and common people. Under such circumstances, investors and officials will possibly seek cooperation with each other to some extent. In other word, investors provide capital while officials perform the responsibitity of protecting their property right. As a result an attached type property right will come into existence and the surplus profit right be shared between the officials and the investors. A case in point is the officials manipulated and businessmen managed Shipping Bureau for Inviting Outside Investment of the late Qing Dynasty. Such a system was formed not only out of the intention of the Qing Dynasty government and its foreign affairs officials but also out of the proportionate choice made by these officials and comprador businessmen.