薪酬激励、董事会监管与上市公司盈余管理

The Management Compensations, Supervision of the Board of Directors and Earnings Management of Listed Companies in China

本文以2002-2004年间沪深两地上市公司为研究样本,分行业采用修正的截面Jones模型对上市公司的可操控性应计利润进行计算,以此作为衡量盈余管理程度的代理变量;在此基础上,考察了高管人员薪酬激励、董事会监管与盈余管理之间的关系。在控制了上市公司资产规模和债务水平之后,研究发现,管理层薪酬水平与调高的操控性应计利润高度正相关,表明薪酬激励构成了中国上市公司盈余管理的一个基本诱因;董事会监管机制对于盈余管理的制约作用并不明显,但本文研究发现董事会规模与调高的操控性应计利润显著负相关,规模较大的董事会能够降低盈余管理的程度。

The paper chooses the listed companies both in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during the period through 2002 to 2004 as research samples; classifies the samples by their industries and uses the cross-sectional adaptation of the modified Jones model to calculate the discretionary total accruals that will be used to measure the extent of earnings management. Then, the paper conducts an empirical examination on the relationship between management compensations, the supervision of the board of directors and earnings management. Controlled the assets size and debts levels of listed companies, the paper finds that there is an significant positive relationship between management compensation and the discretionary total accruals adjusted to increase reported earnings, i.e. the more the management could get cash compensations, the more earnings of listed companies would be reported, which indicates that cash compensation incentives formed one of the most basic inducements for the management of listed companies to implement earnings management; then the paper finds no significant evidences to support that the board of directors could hold efficient supervision roles on earnings management especially those through adjusting the discretionary total accruals to decrease reported earnings, but the paper finds that there is a significant negative relationship between the board size and the discretionary total accruals adjusted to increase the reported earnings, which indicates that the larger the size of the board of directors is, the lower the extent of the discretionary total accruals would be adjusted to increase reported earnings. As compared to the listed companies with small board size, the earnings management of the listed companies that hold relative large board size will be significantly constrained.