双方不确定性下的道德风险问题研究

Moral Hazards Under Double-sided Uncertainty

在分析道德风险中不确定性的基础上,针对现实中委托人与代理人双方面临新的不确定性的现象,建立了双方不确定性下的道德风险模型,扩展了经典道德风险模型的信息结构。通过对双方不确定性下道德风险模型的分析,发现资产类型是否进入委托人的效用函数并不影响最优契约设计,揭示了道德风险中不确定性与信息不对称性对最优契约的叠加规律。

Based on the analysis of uncertainty in moral hazard, aiming at double-sided additional uncertainty phenomena in reality, a moral hazard model is constructed under double -sided uncertainty, which extends the information structure of classical moral hazard model. With such moral hazard model under double -sided uncertainty, it is found that whether assets type enters into utility function of principal or not has no influence on optimal contract design, which discloses the law of adding effects on optimal contract which uncertainty and asymmetric information have in moral hazard.