摘要
研究了逆向物流的实施过程中企业与政府之间的博弈过程。基于博弈论构建了逆向物流实施的静态和动态模型,分析了责任损失系数、折现系数和社会损失系数对企业与政府的影响,有利于政府提高监管效率和企业自觉推行逆向物流。结果表明,企业逆向物流的有效实施,不是只依靠加大惩处力度,而是要建立企业与政府的责任损失机制,还应依据折现系数和社会损失系数对不同的企业制定相应的政策。
The game process between enterprise and government is studied in implementing the reverse logistics. Based on the game theory, this paper builds up a static game model and a dynamic game model, analyzing the responsibility loss coefficient, the discount coefficient and the social loss coefficient which can make impacts on enterprises and government. This will enhance the efficiency of the government supervision and enterprises' application of reverse logistics. The result suggests that severe punishments are not the only effective measures for the promotion of reverse logistics but a system of responsibility loss is needed for both the enterprises and government and a corresponding policy should be made for different enterprises according to discount coefficient and social loss coefficient.
出处
《工业工程》
2007年第6期46-49,66,共5页
Industrial Engineering Journal
基金
河南省软科学基金资助项目(0613025700)
河南省基础与前沿技术基金资助项目(072300420130)
关键词
逆向物流
企业决策
政府监管
博弈分析
reverse logistics
enterprise decision
government supervision
game analysis