“绩效”晋升下我国地方政府非绩效行为诱因——一个博弈论的解释

Analysis on the Non-performance Government Actions in Chinese Local Governments:An Explanation from Game Theory

我国各地广为诟病的重复建设、无用建设、面子工程、形象工程等层出不穷,要从根本上解决这些问题,首先需要区分"政府绩效行为"与"政府非绩效行为",然后找到地方政府非绩效行为的根源。文章在构建了一个博弈模型的基础上,发现这种"非绩效行为"绵延不断,日益翻新的根本原因在于这是处在横向和纵向行政职位晋升激励当中的地方政府领导干部在信息约束和风险规避下作出的理性选择。他们为了取得组织部门任职、升迁考察所需的"绩效",就要同时关注竞争对手的动向,看着竞争对手所在地方政府的"出牌",这样至少可以保证不被竞争对手拉下。但这样做的后果,往往是发起某种政府行为的地方政府与模仿的地方政府行为同时落在了"政府非绩效行为域"中。

In order to prevent redundant, useless and image projects in China,we need to tell the differences between the ＂performance government actions＂ and ＂non-performance government actions＂. By a game model,we find that the reason for so many non-performance government actions in Chinese local governments is the ＂performance＂ based promotion which local governments leaders must face. In order to seize the rare promotion opportunity,the local government leaders have to play a game with their counterparts in other local governments to compete to get the opportunity. They have to imitate one another＇s actions so as not to be defeated,which leads to ＂non-performance government action in Chinese local governments.