建立在行为经济学理论基础上的委托-代理模型:物质效用与动机公平的替代被引量：100

A Principal-Agent Model with Fairness

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摘要本文通过将Rabin（1993）提出的同时考虑了物质效用和“动机公平”的效用函数植入现有的委托-代理模型，获得一个代理人表现出“互惠性”非理性行为的新委托-代理模型。由该模型给出来的最优委托-代理合约在一定条件下可以给委托人带来比现有委托-代理最优合约更高的利润水平。该研究改进和完善了蒲勇健（2007）的结果。与蒲勇健（2007）的研究相比，我们发现在同时考虑了物质效用和“动机公平”的情况下，非理性代理人的行为更加复杂，他会在公平与自利之间寻求平衡。数值模拟的结果表明，模型一般会存在解。 This paper develops a new principal-agent model in which the agent behaves both on rationality and a notion of fairness centered at reciprocity. A distinct feature of the model is that under many circumstances, the optimal contract provides a higher profit than what would be obtained when the agent behaves only on rationality.

作者蒲勇健

机构地区重庆大学经济与工商管理学院

出处《经济学（季刊）》 2007年第1期297-318,共22页 China Economic Quarterly

基金国家社会科学基金项目(07BJY017)的资助

关键词博弈论信息经济学行为经济学

分类号 F270 [经济管理—企业管理]

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参考文献11

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二级参考文献9

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