风险偏好的差异性与融资的多样性

Heterogeneous Risk Preferences and Diversification of Finance

我们认为，公众公司（public company）的企业价值不仅依赖于企业家事后的管理行动，而且依赖于企业家的事前努力。为了实现企业价值最大化，不仅需要给予投资者企业的控制权以遏止企业家的机会主义行为，而且还需要激励企业家的事前努力。也就是说，企业价值不仅受到控制权安排的影响，而且离不开一份企业家收益与企业绩效直接挂钩的激励计划。在如此一份激励计划下，投资者的风险偏好差异性不再是无关紧要的，因为一种区分投资者偏好的融资方式可以节约企业的融资成本，使企业有更多的现金流来激励企业家努力工作。本文证明了，多样性的融资方式，即适当比例的债权-股权融资，在一定的条件下是一种最优的融资机制。而且，在企业家拥有一定初始财富的假定下，我们解释了为什么存在各种各样的资本结构。

We argue that the value of a public company depends not only on the entrepreneur＇s ex post managerial actions, but also on his ex ante efforts. Firm value is not only affected by control right arrangements, but also affected by the incentive scheme linking the entrepreneur＇s salary to firm performance. Given such a scheme, the heterogeneity of investors＇ risk preferences are no longer irrelevant. If it recognizes investors＇ preferences, a finance model can save financing costs and leave a larger cash flow to encourage the entrepreneur to work harder. This paper shows that a finance model with a proper debt-equity ratio is optimal under some conditions. Moreover, under the assumption that the entrepreneur has some initial wealth, we explain why there exists a wide variety of capital structures.