关税结构的政治经济学解释——基于“保护待售”模型的博弈分析

A Political Economy Explanation for Tariff Structure——A Game Theoretical Analysis Based on "Protection for Sale" Model

根据有效保护率理论，由上游至下游逐级递增的梯形关税结构将提高一国最终商品的有效保护程度。但在以美国为代表的西方代议民主制国家，由于利益集团的游说影响，政府的贸易政策并非时刻遵循梯形关税结构的设置原则，甚至有时反其道而行之。对此，本文以Grossman and Helpman（1994）的“保护待售”模型为基础，引入中问产品，研究了政府与上下游产业利益集团之间的博弈行为。结论表明，关税结构实为政治经济体系中的内生产物，其形式取决于上下游产业利益集团的组织情况以及最终商品产业之间的实力差异。

According to the theory of effective protection rate, the echelon structure of tariffs, i. e. , a structure with tariffs increasing from upper stream industries to lower stream industries, can effectively protect domestic final commodities. However, some developed countries, represented by the U. S. A, do not carry out the echelon structure of tariffs, and even invert the structure occasionally. On the basis of the ＂protection for sale＂ model by Grossman and Helpman（1994）, this paper introduces an intermediate good and studies the strategic behavior of the government and industries. Our conclusion shows that the tariff structure is endogenously determined by the political-economic system. In particular, it is determined by the organization of interest groups representing industries and the differences between final goods industries.