再论股票期权——基于中国国情的公司治理实践

Reanalysis of Stock Option:Based on Corporate Governance Practice in China

公司"两权分离"引发了其管理人员的"代理问题",为克服公司(股东)与其管理人员行为目标的不相一致问题,股票期权这一能将公司管理人员劳动付出及其薪酬与公司业绩结合且卓有成效的长期激励方式在西方国家应运而生。长期以来,我国公司经营的低效率与其激励机制的欠缺不无关系,结合我国公司治理实践并借鉴股票期权这一制度对提升公司价值将著有裨益。

The separation of ownership and control of a company brings about the ＂agency problem＂ of managers. As a long-term incentive mode, stock option emerges in western countries to avoid the absence of agreement of conduct goals between stockholders and managers. There could be an aligned relationship among managers＇ efforts, remuneration, and the growth of a company by way of the system of stock option. Some Chinese companies have long been suffering from low efficiency, which has a lot to do with the absence of an incentive mechanism. Obviously, it is beneficial for us to integrate the system of stock option with the practice of corporate governance in China in order to increase company value.