为善何以“可而不能”:荀子论说中的意志自由问题

Why Doing Good Is "Possible But Not Actual":The Free-will Item in Xun Zi's Discourse

荀子在讨论为善问题时,对"可而不能"的现象做了探讨。为了论证"途之人可以为禹",荀子提出,途之人对仁义法正有"可以知之质"与"可以能之具"。借助亚里士多德有关潜能(energeia)与现实(dunamis)的区分,可以认为,荀子是说途之人具备知与能的潜能而非现实。在荀子那里,"能"作为一种德行,表示实践或行动中已实现或完成者。在解释"圣人可积而致,然而皆不可积"现象时,荀子又提出"可以而不可使"的说法,即人可以为而不为,是因为不肯为,亦即不愿为。这里已涉及道德行为中的意愿或意志问题。在这个问题上,荀子与亚里士多德的观点不无相似。但与后者不同,荀子理解的意志或意愿已不完全是个体主动的自由的选择,而带有某种必然的意味。荀子又认为,人之所以想做好事,是因为性恶,因为事物如果短缺什么,就会自动寻求满足。这个短缺理论让人想到奥古斯丁对恶的解释。站在现代立场,对荀子的短缺论可以提出如下批评:自由意志只是人道德转化的必要而非充分条件,道德转化能否成功依赖于道德行为主体与其社会文化环境的复杂互动,其中亦不乏道德运气的因素。

： Xun Zi has discussed the phenomena that doing Good is ＂possible but not actual＂. According to Xun Zi, it dues to people＇s unwilling. Here we could find the item of free-will in moral action which Aristotle has fully studied in Metaphysics. Unlike Aristotle regards it as an active choice of the agent, Xun Zi prefers to take the will as something like necessity. Believing that things will automatically after its satisfaction if it is lack of something, Xun Zi holds that it is the evil nature to drive people to do good things. This lacking-theory makes us think of St. Augustin＇s explanations of Evil. However, what they try solve is different： for Xun Zi, the free-will is used to explain why people with the evil nature could do good; for Augustin, the free-will is used to answer why omnipotent God creates human who would do evil. On the other hand, their understanding of lacking is different too： Xun Zi believes that lacking results in the requirement while Augustin thinks that lacking of good does not lead people automatically to after good at all. In other words, Xun Zi admits that people could do good thing with their own reasons guiding while Augustin convinces that the evil people will not do good thing except for relying on the grace of God. From the view of contemporary moral philosophy, a possible criticism on Xun ZiPs lacking-theory is that free will is the necessary but not sufficient condition for moral transformation.