国有企业主导与行政性垄断下的价格合谋——“京沪空中快线”引发的若干思考

State-owned Enterprise Dominant,Administrative Monopoly and Price Collusion

本文基于民航产业的价格同盟进行的模型分析和经验研究,在一定程度上解释了行政垄断和企业间合谋的关系。研究发现,在规制缺失或默许的条件下,包含惩罚方式的价格合谋是一个可行和可实施的机制安排,而寡头垄断和行政垄断的结合是诱发规制者干预价格竞争,最终形成所谓"价格同盟"的结构和制度条件。规制者和垄断国有企业关系的交织和错位下的反竞争行为,是未来《反垄断法》实施的主要障碍。

This paper builds up a theory model and empirical studies on the case of the price coalition in China airline industries, and tries to understand the relationships between the administration and collusion. The findings of the article is under the regulatory shortage or its acquiescence, the enterprise price collusion with punishment is an feasible and complement regime, the combination between oligopoly and administration induce the regulatory intervenes the market price, this meaning the administration monopoly is the biases for the price collusion. The anti-competition conduct under the regulatory with stated-owned enterprise will become the barrier for the antitrust law.