信息不对称下交通运输管理中的最优激励

Optimal Incentive for Transportation Management under Asymmetric Information

应用信息经济学的委托代理理论,将政府作为委托人,交通运输管理人员作为代理人,研究了在委托人对代理人的能力水平有不完全信息的逆向选择和在管理活动中代理人的努力程度等行为不可能跟踪监督的道德风险同时存在的广义委托代理中的最优激励机制.通过建立非线性规划的数学模型,获得了在风险中性的委托人为具有"勤能补拙"特征的风险厌恶的代理人设计的最优激励工资合同的混同均衡的显式解,混同的工资合同解释了岗位工资的合理性和激励作用.

Regarding the government as the principal ,the transportation manager as the agent, applying principal-agent theory of information economics ,the optimal incentive mechanism was studied in the setup with adverse selection and moral hazard simultaneously. By constructing the model to nonlinear programming and using the Kuhn-Tucker theorem ,the explicit solution of the optimal incentive wage contracts was obtained in the situation which the less ability agents can catch up the more ability ones by working hard. These pool contracts indicate the incentive effect of the post wage.