产业集群中的行业协会——基于多边惩罚策略的第三方私人治理机制

Business Association in Clusters:the Private Governance Mechanism from the Third Party Based on Multilateral Punishment Tactics

本文通过构建一个多边惩罚策略下的博弈模型,解释了产业集群中行业协会如何消除企业的机会主义行为,从而使行业协会的信誉机制和企业的合作行为得以建立。我们的基本结论是:产业集群中行业协会提供的正式交流渠道,能够在很大程度上克服信息在个体间传递时的失真问题,进而能够节约协会成员及其潜在交易者的信息搜寻成本,有助于克服集体非理性行为;行业协会具有可信的监督和惩罚机制,能够使企业机会主义行为的成本大于收益,有利于集群内企业合作行为的实现。而行业协会的负面作用则体现在其反竞争行为上。本文的基本结论可以为政府进行产业集群升级、提升集群竞争力提供一定的理论支持。

This paper examines how business association in clusters dispels the opportunistic behavior to facilitate trust mechanism and cooperative behavior among enterprises in clusters. We address this issue by setting up a game theory model under multilateral punishment tactics. Our research results are as following： the formal exchange channel that association in clusters offers can avoid the distortion of information transmitted among small firms owners to a great extent. Business association economizes information-searching cost of association members and potential dealers, which will help avoid the cluster collective unrational behavior; the association has believable supervision and punishment mechanism, which can make the cost of enterprise＇s opportunistic behavior greater than incomes and is favorable to the realization of enterprise＇s cooperative behavior in cluster. But association has its own disadvantages, which focus on its anti-competitive behavior Our results can to a certain extent provide a theoretical support for the government＇s idea on upgrading local clusters and improving local enterprises competitive ability in clusters.