摘要
结合供应链运作的特点,从指派博弈的角度分析了供应链成员企业的合作战略,以整体收益最大化为目标考虑成员企业的生产能力约束,将供应链整体设计经济模型向多层次、多对多合作的方向上进行了拓展,并证实了模型中合作博弈核心解的存在性.本文研究表明:供应链联盟核心企业在内部成员企业生产成本和意愿支付的基础上指导其合理的安排合作关系,可以使得供应链整体收益得到优化.而且,由于该合作战略符合合作博弈核心其实施也进一步提高了供应链联盟的整体稳定性.
Based on the operation characteristics of supply chain, we establish an m-to-n 1 collaboration economic model for multi-echelon supply chain network design, with the objective of maximizing their profits and the constraint of enterprise production capacity. Our study shows that, the core enterprises in supply chain alliance can maximize their whole network profits by coordinating the cooperation relationships among member enterprises properly under their total production cost and willingness-to-pay constrain. Since this cooperation strategy is satisfied the definition of the core, its practice can enhance the stability of supply chain.
出处
《河北工业大学学报》
CAS
2007年第6期57-62,共6页
Journal of Hebei University of Technology
关键词
供应链
生产能力约束
指派博弈
核心
supply chain
production capacity restriction
assignment game
core