基于现金股利的大股东掏空研究——来自股权分置改革前后的经验证据

Tunneling Based on Dividend Policy: Empirical Study from the Share Segregation Reform

本文以双重委托代理理论为依托,以2002年～2006年沪深两市所有的现金股利分配事件为样本,通过建立一系列假设并进行实证分析,发现我国上市公司中的确存在以高派现为手段的大股东掏空行为。此外,本文在回归分析中引入虚拟变量,对股改前后的现金股利政策进行对比分析,发现股权分置改革对大股东通过高派现来掏空上市公司有一定的抑制作用。

This article, using the cash dividend distribution samples from 2002 to 2006 in China＇ s stock market, concludes that there does exist tunneling in the market after an empirical study based on the double principle-agent theory. Subsequently, dummy variable is introduced into the regression model to make a contrast of dividend policy before and after the share segregation reform, and the conclusion shows that the reform has played its role in prohibiting tunneling.